When Ayatollah Ali Khamenei delivered his defiant and inflammatory speech on Wednesday, many around the world were left bewildered by his tone — one that suggested Iran stood on equal footing with Israel, and perhaps even with the United States. His posture made it seem as if nothing had changed, despite the devastating blows his military apparatus had suffered at Israel’s hands since Friday.
Perhaps, prior to Israel dismantling major elements of Iran’s nuclear, missile, and drone capabilities; before the deaths of nine out of thirteen of his senior commanders; before dozens of mid-tier officials were eliminated; and before an air defense network of over 70 batteries was obliterated — perhaps then, such a speech might have struck fear into global capitals like Jerusalem and Washington.
But after the decimation his military has faced, the tone of Khamenei’s address seemed almost surreal.
For many observers, the natural conclusion was that he must be playing a calculated public relations game — aware of Iran’s grim situation but projecting strength to boost morale, deter further U.S. involvement, and negotiate better terms in a post-conflict settlement.
However, The Jerusalem Post is now reporting that a more shocking and sinister possibility exists: some of Khamenei’s inner circle — those few who have survived — may be feeding him false information. He may genuinely believe that Iran is faring far better in the conflict than it actually is.
If true, this wouldn’t mark the first time that Khamenei had been misled by advisers on pivotal matters of war and diplomacy.
On April 1, the Israeli Air Force killed Mohammed Reza Zahedi, the Quds Force’s most senior commander for Lebanon and Syria, in a strike that also took the lives of over a dozen IRGC and Iranian officials.
At that point, Zahedi was the highest-ranking Iranian figure to be eliminated since the outbreak of hostilities, even surpassing the seniority of Sayyed Reza Mousavi, who had been killed in December 2023.
Zahedi was not only responsible for overseeing terrorism against Israel from its northern borders, but he also served as Iran’s top liaison with Hezbollah.
Although Israel initially refrained from publicly claiming the strike, Iran and Hezbollah wasted no time blaming Jerusalem, seeing Zahedi’s death as a critical hit to Hezbollah’s strategic capabilities.
According to Iranian media, Zahedi was in a meeting with leaders from Palestinian Islamic Jihad when he was killed.
He also led Unit 18,000 of the Quds Force, which managed arms smuggling and the transfer of precision-guided munitions into Lebanon. His previous roles included commanding the IRGC’s Air Force and the Imam Hussein Division.
Later, Israeli sources clarified that the airstrike had targeted a building next to the Iranian embassy in Syria — not the embassy itself.
But that’s not how the event was portrayed to the outside world.
Outraged, the Iranian Embassy in Lebanon declared: “This barbaric Israeli aggression is a flagrant violation of international laws, diplomatic norms, and the requirements of the Vienna Convention.”
Reports at the time claimed that the building struck was used as the ambassador’s residence and was situated near the Canadian Embassy in Damascus.
The Jerusalem Post has since uncovered that, due to staffing overflow, Iranian embassy personnel occasionally used that adjacent structure for work-related purposes, though it was not officially an embassy.
Sources told The Post that the IRGC frequently used the same building for covert intelligence and terror planning.
Most significantly, the newspaper learned that Khamenei himself was told the strike had hit an official Iranian embassy.
Khamenei rarely leaves his secured locations and relies heavily on a tight circle of advisers to brief him on global developments.
According to The Post, some of these advisers may have intentionally misled him, causing him to believe the Israeli strike constituted a direct assault on sovereign Iranian soil.
Consequently, Khamenei’s decision-making may have been based not just on Zahedi’s death but on what he believed was an unprecedented diplomatic violation.
Iran embraced this narrative with such force that, even now, many senior American officials privately acknowledge to The Post that they still believe Israel bombed an official embassy compound — despite Israeli insistence to the contrary.
Israeli leaders stress that the building lacked any diplomatic markings and that even Lebanon’s records didn’t classify it as a diplomatic site.
This manipulation of information is critical, because it likely spurred Khamenei to authorize Iran’s first-ever direct strike on Israeli territory during April 13–14 — launching over 100 ballistic missiles, around 170 drones, and several cruise missiles.
That moment marked a historic rupture. After decades of indirect warfare through proxies and covert operations, Israel and Iran were now openly engaged in head-on conflict.
In Israeli security circles, this direct attack was considered the intelligence community’s second greatest blunder of the war, second only to the October 7, 2023, Hamas onslaught.
While Israeli analysts did anticipate an Iranian response, they believed it would still come via intermediaries like Hezbollah, and not involve the massive use of long-range weaponry.
Then-IDF Intelligence Chief Aharon Haliva was ultimately forced to resign in April 2024 — not because of the October 7 failure, but due to his underestimation of Khamenei’s escalation following Zahedi’s killing.
Though he stayed on for a short period due to the wartime crisis, the intelligence failure to predict Iran’s direct assault was seen as a major lapse.
In hindsight, a contributing factor to the miscalculation appears to be that IDF analysts didn’t grasp the full extent to which Khamenei had been misled by his own advisers, some of whom seemingly encouraged an extreme response.
Several of those figures are believed to have died in recent Israeli operations. Yet others remain — including individuals who may favor a prolonged war, disregard the suffering of Iranian civilians, or simply fear telling Khamenei the brutal truth.
This mirrors past episodes in Middle Eastern history, such as when Egyptian generals fed President Nasser false reports of victory during the Six Day War, even as Israel’s forces decimated them.
It’s possible that Khamenei’s Wednesday speech reflected not propaganda — but sincere belief in a warped version of reality.
If that’s the case, Israel’s leadership must recognize that ending this war could be far more complex. Dealing with an adversary who is genuinely misinformed about his own situation is far more dangerous than facing a rational actor with an accurate understanding of his losses.
{Matzav.com Israel}